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Abstract
Currently there is a growing literature exploring the features of optimal monetary
policy in New Keynesian models under both commitment and discretion. This litera-
ture usually solves for the optimal allocations that are consistent with a rational expec-
tations market equilibrium, but it does not study how the policy can be implemented
given the available policy instruments. Recently, however, King and Wolman (2004)
have shown that a time-consistent policy cannot be implemented through the control of
nominal money balances. In particular, they ﬁnd that equilibria are not unique under a
money stock regime. We ﬁnd that their conclusion of non-uniqueness of Markov-perfect
equilibria is sensitive to the instrument of choice. Surprisingly, if, instead, the mone-
tary authority chooses the nominal interest rate there exists a unique Markov-perfect
equilibrium. We then investigate under what conditions a time-consistent planner can
implement the optimal allocation by just announcing his policy rule in a decentralized
setting.
∗ This is a substantially revised version of a paper previously circulating under the title “Interest Rate
versus Money Supply Instruments: On the Implementation of Markov-Perfect Policy." We would like to
thank Alex Wolman, Per Krusell, Bob King, and Jesus Fernandez Villeverde for comments. The views
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia, the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, or the Federal Reserve System. This paper is
available free of charge at www.philadephiafed.org/research-and-data/
† Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
‡ Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond1 Introduction
C u r r e n t l yt h e r ei sag r o w i n gl i t e r a t u r ee x p l o r i n gt h ef e a t u r e so fo p t i m a lm o n e t a r yp o l i c yi n
New Keynesian models under both commitment and discretion. This work usually assumes
that the optimal policy solves a constrained planning problem where the policymaker chooses
among all allocations that are consistent with a market equilibrium. Recently, however,
attention has been paid to how to implement the optimal policy through instrument rules.
We believe that this is an important area of inquiry, because the institutions responsible
for setting policies rarely have direct control over allocations. It is therefore important to
understand whether or not a planner’s allocations are obtainable with a given institutional
structure.
For the case of time-consistent policies that are Markov-perfect, King and Wolman (2004)
have examined implementation issues when the monetary authority uses nominal money bal-
ances as the policy instrument in a sticky price environment. Surprisingly, they ﬁnd that
equilibria are no longer unique under a money-supply regime. Conditional on a given con-
tinuation allocation determined by the future policymaker, the current policymaker cannot
implement a unique point-in-time equilibrium. These multiple equilibria are supported by
strategic complementarities in the price-setting process. In particular, if a price-setting
ﬁrm believes that all other price-adjusting ﬁrms will set relatively high (low) prices, then it
will be optimal for the individual ﬁrm to set a relatively high (low) price. We clarify how
strategic complementarities interact with the money-supply rule. In particular, we show
that multiple equilibria arise because the money-supply rule weakens the existing strate-
gic complementarities in the price-setting process for low inﬂation outcomes. Each one of
the multiple point-in-time equilibria for a money-supply rule is associated with a diﬀerent
inﬂation rate and nominal interest rate.
We then study the implementability of a Markov-perfect nominal interest rate policy,
since actual monetary policy is usually implemented through interest rate policies. We ﬁnd
that a policy that uses the nominal interest rate as the policy instrument implements a
1unique point-in-time equilibrium. Given the well-understood problems involving interest
rate instruments in other settings, this may be an unexpected result. We obtain this result
because contrary to the money-supply rule, the nominal interest rate instrument uniformly
strengthens strategic complementarities and thereby eliminates multiple equilibria.
Once we have established that a nominal interest rate rule can implement the unique
Markov-perfect equilibrium of the planning problem, we ask if this policy rule can also
implement a unique rational expectations equilibrium. Here we are faced with a long-
established literature, starting with Sargent and Wallace (1975), that shows that interest
rate policies tend to yield indeterminate equilibria unless the interest rate is conditioned on
other variables. However, because we are considering only Markov-perfect equilibria, the
planner is prohibited from making the interest rate conditional on other endogenous vari-
ables. The restriction of analyzing only unconditional nominal interest rate rules introduces
a real indeterminacy into the local dynamics of the rational expectations equilibrium in our
environment.1
On the one hand, our analysis of Markov-perfect equilibria sidesteps this issue because
it essentially picks McCallum’s (1983) minimal state variable solution as the rational expec-
tations equilibrium. Thus, we ﬁnd that the minimum state variable solution for the fully
decentralized environment is locally unique with sticky prices, a result that does not hold
when prices are ﬂexible.2 For those who ﬁnd this equilibrium restriction compelling, one may
interpret this result as allowing the planner to achieve the optimal time-consistent allocation
in a fully decentralized environment. If not, then one can also employ a technique that has
been used to make interest rate policies yield determinate equilibria; see, e.g., Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2001) and Adão, Correia, and Teles (2003). We can maintain the assumption
that the monetary policy rule is Markov-perfect and yet eliminate the real indeterminacy
from the rational expectations equilibrium by assuming that the rule simultaneously sets
1The presence of a real indeterminacy for ﬁxed nominal interest rate policies in sticky price models has
been pointed out before in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998).
2The indeterminancy of nominal interest rate rules in a ﬂexible price environment has been studied
extensively; for example, see McCallum (1986) or Boyd and Dotsey (1994).
2the nominal interest rate and the nominal money supply. This approach selects the optimal
allocation out of the multiplicity of possible equilibria.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we brieﬂy describe the problem of implementing the
allocations from Markov-perfect optimal policies through instrument rules. Then we study
the problem in a standard New Keynesian economy, which is identical to the one used by
King and Wolman (2004). We ﬁrst review the King and Wolman (2004) result that using a
money-supply instrument generates multiple equilibria. We then show that using an interest
rate instrument uniquely implements the Markov-perfect allocation. Finally, we discuss
how a synthesis of the two instruments, the money supply and the nominal interest rate,
uniquely implements the Markov-perfect allocation as a rational expectations equilibrium.
A brief summary concludes.
2 Implementation of Markov-Perfect Policies
Consider a policymaker that chooses a sequence of allocations, {xt,s t}, in order to maximize




tU (xt,s t) (1)
subject to the constraint that the allocations are consistent with a competitive equilibrium3
F (xt,s t;xt+1,s t+1)=0 . (2)
The vector of allocations (xt,s t) may contain prices and quantities. Implicit in the statement
of the planning problem is the assumption that the policymaker directly controls prices and
quantities, subject to the constraint that they are consistent with the optimizing behavior
of agents in the competitive equilibrium (CE).
3Even though in the particular economy we will study below ﬁrms that set their prices are assumed to
behave as monopolistic competitors, we will use the terminology ‘competitive equilibrium.’
3We distinguish between pre-determined state variables, st, and other non-predetermined
variables, xt.F r o mt h eC Ec o n s t r a i n t ,i ti sa p p a r e n tt h a tt h ep o l i c y m a k e r ’ sc u r r e n tc h o i c e s
are constrained by the expectations about future outcomes. This feature can give rise to
a time-consistency problem, in that a policymaker that plans an optimal time path for all
future choices has an incentive to deviate from that plan in the future if he has the option
to reoptimize (Kydland and Prescott (1977)). Solutions to the planning problem that are
derived under the assumption that the policymaker will never deviate from the plan devised
at time zero are called full-commitment solutions.
We study Markov-perfect policies, a class of policies that avoids the time-consistency
problem. Markov-perfect policies restrict choices to be contingent only on payoﬀ-relevant
state variables. At any point in time the policymaker is assumed to decide only on the current
non-predetermined variables, xt, and next period’s state variables, st+1, taking the current
state, st, and the decisions of future policymakers as given. In particular, it is assumed that
future policy decisions are characterized by a policy rule
(xτ,s τ+1)=( Gx (sτ),G s (sτ)) for τ>t ,
that is consistent with the CE constraints. Conditional on the policy rule, a decision on
next period’s state generates a sequence of allocations {(xτ,s τ+1):τ>t } and thereby a





τU [xt+1+τ (st+1;G),s t+1+τ (st+1;G)] (3)
Today’s optimal policy choice then solves the problem
g(st;G)=a r g m a x
xt,st+1
{U (xt,s t)+βV (st+1;G)} (4)
s.t. F [xt,s t,G x (st+1),s t+1]=0 .
4A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a ﬁxed point for the policy rules g and G,
g(s;G)=G(s) for all s. (5)
In general, it is diﬃcult to characterize Markov-perfect equilibria since they involve the
search for a ﬁxed point in function spaces. Most of the literature studying Markov-perfect
equilibria is restricted to linear-quadratic or to higher order polynominal local approxima-
tions of the original problem. One of our objectives is to see if Markov-perfect equilibria
can be globally implemented, and thus local approximation methods are not useful.4 Global
nonlinear computational methods tend to be limited to a small number of state variables.
Furthermore, the computational procedure usually works on the assumption that the policy
rule is unique. Thus again this approach is not helpful for our question.
The study of Markov-perfect equilibria simpliﬁes considerably if there are no payoﬀ-
relevant state variables. In this case the optimal Markov-perfect policy will be a constant
allocation, x∗, that solves the problem
x
∗ =a r gm a x
x u(x) s.t. f (x,x
∗)=0 . (6)
We are concerned with the implementation of Markov-perfect policies through a policy
rule where the policymaker does not choose all elements of the allocation. For this purpose
we assume that the allocation vector, x, can be partitioned into two subsets, variables deter-
mined by the private sector, y, and policy instruments, z. A policy rule is then a constant
vector z∗. A Markov-perfect policy is implementable if conditional on the policy rule z∗,t h e
market constraints (2) deﬁne a unique rational expectations equilibrium. In order for the
Markov-perfect policy to be implementable, three conditions have to be satisﬁed.
First, there needs to be a unique steady state, since in the absence of state variables
4Local approximations are also often problematic, since the steady state of the Markov-perfect equilibrium
around which we want to approximate the economy usually depends on the shape of the policy rule, which
is not known a priori.
5admissable continuation values will be steady-state values. Second, there has to be a unique
point-in-time equilibrium. By this we mean that conditional on the current policy and the
Markov-perfect outcome for the next period there exists a unique allocation and prices in
the current period such that we have a market equilibrium




King and Wolman (2004) demonstrate for a simple model with sticky prices that a money
stock rule does not give rise to a unique point-in-time equilibrium. This result is due to
non-linearities induced by the money stock rule. Below we will argue that in the same
environment an interest rate rule implements a unique point-in-time equilibrium.
Third, there has to be a unique dynamic equilibrium. By this we mean that conditional
on the policy rule today and in all future periods there exists a unique rational expectations
equilibrium
∃!{yt} s.t. f (yt,z
∗,y t+1,z
∗)=0for all t. (8)
This is just the usual condition for the existence of a unique rational expectations equilibrium
conditional on some policy rule. We will argue that even though an interest rate policy has a
unique point-in-time equilibrium, it is not dynamically unique unless one is willing to limit
consideration to minimum state variable solutions Although this result has the ﬂavor of the
Sargent and Wallace (1975) result on the indeterminacy of interest rate policies, it diﬀers
from their result in that, for our example, the real allocation is indeterminate rather than the
price level alone being indeterminate. We will also argue that a more general concept of the
Markov-perfect policy rule eliminates this indeterminacy. In particular, if the policymaker
jointly determines the money growth rule and the interest rate, albeit consistent with the
CE conditions, the policy rule will uniquely implement the Markov-perfect allocation and
prices.
63T h e E c o n o m y
T h e r ei sa ni n ﬁnitely lived representative household with preferences over consumption and
leisure. The consumption good is produced using a constant-returns-to-scale technology with
a continuum of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. Each intermediate good is produced by
a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm with labor as the only input. Intermediate goods ﬁrms
set the nominal price for their products for two periods, and an equal share of intermediate
ﬁrms adjusts their nominal price in any particular period. Also, in what follows we restrict
our analysis to perfect foresight economies.
3.1 The representative household
The representative household’s utility is a function of consumption ct,a n dt h ef r a c t i o no f




t [lnct − χnt], (9)
where χ ≥ 0,a n d0 <β<1. The household is assumed to hold money in order to pay for
consumption purchases
Ptct ≤ Mt. (10)
The household’s period budget constraint is
Ptct + Bt + Mt ≤ Wtnt + Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 − Pt−1ct−1 + Vt + Tt, (11)
where Pt is the nominal price level, Wt is the nominal wage rate, Bt are the end-of-period
holdings of nominal bonds, Tt are lump-sum transfers, and Rt−1 is the gross nominal interest
rate on bonds. The agent owns all ﬁrms in the economy, and Vt is nominal proﬁti n c o m e
from ﬁrms. The household can adjust money holdings Mt a tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h ep e r i o d .
We will use the term “real” to denote nominal variables deﬂated by the nominal price level,
which is the price of the aggregate consumption good, and we use lower case letters to denote
7real variables. For example, real balances are mt ≡ Mt/Pt.
The relevant ﬁrst order conditions of the representative household’s problem are5
1/ct = λt (12)





Equation (12) equates the multiplier on the household’s budget constraint, λ, with the
marginal utility of consumption. Equation (13) states that the marginal utility derived from
the real wage equals the marginal disutility from work. Equation (14) is the Euler equation,
which states that the marginal utility loss from saving one more unit today is equated with
the discounted marginal utility gain from the real rate of return on savings tomorrow.
3.2 Firms
The consumption good is produced using a continuum of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods as
inputs to a constant-returns-to-scale technology. Producers of the consumption good behave
competitively in their markets. There is a measure one of intermediate goods, indexed








where ε>1. Given nominal prices P (j) for the intermediate goods, the nominal unit cost








5The cash constraint (10) is binding for positive interest rates, and we have already substituted out for
the Lagrange multiplier on the cash constraint.
8For a given level of production, the cost-minimizing demand for intermediate good j depends
on the good’s relative price, p(j) ≡ P(j)/P,
yt(j)=pt (j)
−ε ct.( 1 7 )
Each intermediate good is produced by a single ﬁrm, and j indexes both the ﬁrm and
good. Firm j produces y(j) units of its good using a constant-returns technology with labor
as the only input,
yt(j)=nt(j).( 1 8 )
Each ﬁrm behaves competitively in the labor market and takes wages as given. Real marginal
cost in terms of consumption goods is
ψt = wt. (19)
S i n c ee a c hi n t e r m e d i a t eg oodi su n i q u e ,i n t e r m e d i a t eg ood sp r od u c e r sh a v es o m em o n o po l y
power, and they face downward sloping demand curves (17). Intermediate goods producers
set their nominal price for two periods, and they maximize the discounted expected present
















yt+1 (j).( 2 0 )
Since the ﬁrm is owned by the representative household, the household’s intertemporal mar-
ginal rate of substitution is used to discount future proﬁts. Using the deﬁnition of the ﬁrm’s
demand function (17) and the household’s intertemporal rate of substitution, the ﬁrst order



















9where μ = ε/(ε − 1) i st h es t a t i cm a r k u pw i t hﬂexible prices.
3.3 A symmetric equilibrium
We will study a symmetric equilibrium where all ﬁrms that face the same constraints behave
the same. This means that in every period there will be two ﬁrm types: the ﬁrms that
adjust their nominal price in the current period, type 0 ﬁrms with relative price p0,a n d
the ﬁrms that adjusted their price in the previous period, type 1 ﬁrms with current relative
price p1. E a c hp e r i o dh a l fo fa l lﬁrms have the option to adjust their nominal price. The
equilibrium of the economy is completely described by the sequence of marginal cost, relative
prices, inﬂation rates, nominal interest rates, and real balances, {ψt,p 0,t,p 1,t,πt+1,Rt,m t},
such that
0=( p0,t)






























Equation (22) restates the optimal pricing equation, (21), for a ﬁrm that can adjust its price
in the current period. Equation (23) is the price index equation (16) for relative prices.
Equation (24) relates the inﬂation rate πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 to the ratio of a price-adjusting ﬁrm’s
optimal current relative price and next period’s preset relative price. Equation (25) relates
real balances to marginal cost, using the household’s optimal labor supply condition, (13),
together with the fact that real balances are equal to consumption. Equation (26) is the
household Euler equation, (14), after substituting for the marginal utility of income from
(12) and (13). For ease of exposition we will drop time subscripts from now on and denote
next period’s values by a prime.
10Allocations in this economy are suboptimal because of two distortions. The ﬁrst distortion
results from the monopolistically competitive structure of intermediate goods production:
the price of an intermediate good is not equal to its marginal cost. The average markup
in the economy is the inverse of the real wage, P/W, which is, according to equation (19),
the inverse marginal cost 1/ψ. The second distortion reﬂects ineﬃcient production when
relative prices are diﬀerent from one. Using the ﬁrm’s demand function (17) and aggregate
production (15) we can obtain the total demand for labor as a function of relative prices
and aggregate output. Solving aggregate labor demand for aggregate output we obtain an
‘aggregate’ production function









Given the symmetric production structure, equations (15) and (18), eﬃcient production
requires that equal quantities of each intermediate good be produced. The degree of alloca-
tional ineﬃciency is reﬂected in the term a ≤ 1. The allocation is eﬃcient if a =1 , implying
that p0 = p1 =1 .
The policymaker is assumed to maximize lifetime utility of the representative agent,
taking the competitive equilibrium conditions (22)-(26) as constraints. For a time-consistent
Markov-perfect policy the policymaker takes future policy choices as given and policy choices
are functions of payoﬀ-relevant state variables only. Because there are no state variables in
our example, this amounts to the planner maximizing the current period utility function of a
representative agent and choosing an unconditional value for the policy instrument. Taking
future policy as given means that the planner has no control over future outcomes, such as
future relative prices or allocations.
One usually states the problem in terms of the planner choosing the market allocation. In
this case we can view the planner choosing a vector y =( p0,p 1,π0,ψ) subject to constraints
(22)-(24), and conditional on the choices of next period’s policymaker, y0. The planner’s
11choices determine the representative household’s utility through their impact on allocational
eﬃciency and the markup. In this model, with ε =1 1 , implying a markup of approximately
10 percent, and χ =1 /1.1 the optimal allocation of consumption and labor is .9996 and 1.0
respectively. Thus, there is very little allocational ineﬃciency. This allocation implies an
annual inﬂation rate of 1.82 percent and a nominal interest rate of 2.84 percent. We will use
this parameterization in the following examples.
Note that the statement of the planner’s problem in terms of the market allocation does
not involve any reference to the policy instrument, z, be it real balances or the nominal
interest rate. To determine whether the Markov-perfect equilibrium can be implemented as
described in equations (7) or (8), we have to characterize the feasible set for market outcomes
y conditional on the policy instrument.
4 Implementation of Point-in-Time Equilibria
In most models of monetary economies money-supply policies lead to a unique equilibrium
with a determinate price level, whereas interest rate policies imply equilibrium indeterminacy.
Exactly the opposite is true for the simple economy we have just described. As King and
Wolman (2004) have shown, a Markov-perfect money-supply rule will imply non-uniqueness
for the point-in-time equilibrium, and as we will show, a Markov-perfect interest rate policy
will imply a unique point-in-time equilibrium. It turns out that (non)uniqueness of the
equilibrium is related to the presence of strategic complementarities in the price-setting
process and how the policy rule ampliﬁes or weakens these complementarities.
Before we discuss the two policy rules, we want to demonstrate that strategic comple-
mentarities are inherent to the ﬁrms’ price-setting problem. In the context of the model’s
monopolistic-competition framework, strategic complementarities are said to be present if
it is optimal for an individual price-adjusting ﬁrm to increase its own relative price, p0,i f
all other price-adjusting ﬁrms increase their relative price, ¯ p0. To study this issue we use
12a graphic representation of the individual ﬁrm’s FOC for proﬁt maximization, (22), which
states that the sum of today’s marginal proﬁt, MP (p0,ψ), and tomorrow’s discounted mar-
ginal proﬁt, βMP (p0/π0,ψ
0)/π0, has to be zero. For the proﬁt maximization problem to be
well-deﬁned we need the proﬁt function to be concave; that is, the marginal proﬁt function
MP is decreasing in the relative price. In the Appendix we also show that
Proposition 1 With constant marginal cost, ψ = ψ
0, tomorrow’s marginal proﬁt, MP (p0/π0,ψ
0)/π0,
is increasing in the inﬂation rate π0 for a neighborhood around zero inﬂation, π0 =1 .
In Figure 1 we graph today’s (red line) and tomorrow’s marginal proﬁt (blue line) for an
individual ﬁrm conditional on all other ﬁrms’ relative price, ¯ p0, and a positive inﬂation rate.
The positive inﬂation rate erodes the ﬁrm’s relative price tomorrow and therefore the ﬁrm
will set its optimal price, p0, above the static proﬁt-maximizing relative price, μψ, such that
it balances today’s negative marginal proﬁt against tomorrow’s positive marginal proﬁt. Now
suppose that all other ﬁrms increase their relative price. It follows from expression (24) that
the inﬂation rate will increase, π0 =¯ p0/p0
1, and this will shift tomorrow’s marginal proﬁtc u r v e
up, leaving today’s marginal proﬁt curve unchanged. It is then optimal for the individual ﬁrm
to also increase its own relative price. Thus, there is a source of strategic complementarities,
independent of monetary policy. The choice of monetary policy instrument will modify
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Figure 1. Strategic Complementarities
4.1 A money supply policy
We now review King and Wolman’s (2004) analysis of a Markov-perfect nominal money
stock rule. We ﬁrst show that such a policy will in general imply the existence of multiple
steady states. Furthermore, we show that the point-in-time equilibrium is not unique even
conditional on a particular steady state allocation for the continuation of the economy. The
equilibrium is not unique because for low inﬂation rates the money stock rule weakens the
existing strategic complementarities in the price-setting process.
King and Wolman (2004) assume a homogeneous monetary policy rule that sets the
nominal money stock in proportion to the preset nominal price from the last period
M =˜ mP1. (28)
In terms of the Markov problem (7) the policy instrument is z =˜ m. Combining the policy
14rule (28) with the money demand equation (10) yields the modiﬁed policy rule in real terms
c =˜ mp1. (29)
Finally, combining (29) with the optimal labor supply condition (13) yields the equilibrium
condition for marginal cost
ψ = χ˜ mp1. (30)
4.1.1 (Non)uniqueness of the steady state
We now show that for most values of the money-supply policy parameter, ˜ m, the steady-
state of the economy will not be unique. Since in a Markov-perfect equilibrium without
state variables the expected future policy has to be a steady-state, non-uniqueness of the
steady-state alone suggests that the monetary policy rule may result in indeterminacy of the
point-in-time equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There exist values ˜ mmin < ˜ m1 =1 /(χμ) ≤ ˜ m2 such that (1) if ˜ m ∈
(˜ mmin, ˜ m1] then there exists a unique non-inﬂationary steady-state; (2) if ˜ m ∈ (˜ m1, ˜ m2),
then there exist two inﬂationary steady-states; (3) if ˜ m =˜ m2 then there exists a unique
inﬂationary steady-state; and (4) if ˜ m>˜ m2 then no steady-state exists.
Proof. Substitute (30) for marginal cost in (22) and obtain the following steady-state map-









In steady-state, the nominal interest rate, R > 1, and because βR = π∗, π∗ > β. For
π∗ ∈ (β,1], h(π∗) is strictly increasing and less than one. For positive inﬂation, π∗ > 1,
the function h satisﬁes (1) h(π∗) >h (1) = 1 and (2) h(∞)=1 .S i n c e h is continuous
the function must eventually be decreasing if it is to approach 1 as π∗ →∞ . So there must
15exist an inﬂation rate π2 such that h(π∗) ≤ h2 = h(π2).F u r t h e r m o r e ,h is monotonically
increasing (decreasing) for π∗ <π 2 (π∗ >π 2). Let ˜ m1 =1 /(χμ) and ˜ m2 =˜ m1h2.T h e
proposition follows immediately from the properties of the h function.¥
Figure 2 displays the steady-state inﬂation rates π∗ consistent with the money rule ˜ m
for the parameter values used in section 3.3, in particular, χμ =1 .N o t e t h a t˜ m1 is the
money-supply policy parameter associated with a zero steady-state inﬂation rate, and that
the range of policy parameters associated with multiple steady-states is relevant, since the
optimal Markov-perfect policy is inﬂationary.


































Figure 2. Steady State Multiplicity with a Money Rule
4.1.2 Non-uniqueness of the point-in-time equilibrium
Suppose that we choose one of the possible steady-states as a continuation of the economy
in the next period. We now show that the choice of a money-supply instrument weakens
16strategic complementarities when the average ﬁrm chooses a low relative price, and that the
complementarities persist when the average ﬁrm chooses a high relative price. The resulting
shape change of the optimal reaction function, that is, the mapping from the average ﬁrm’s
relative price to an individual ﬁrm’s optimal relative price response, gives rise to multiple
point-in-time equilibria.
Consider again the response of an individual ﬁrm to an increase in the relative price set
by all other ﬁrms, but now allow for the feedback coming through the money stock policy.
When all other price-adjusting ﬁrms increase their relative price, it follows from the price
index equation, (23), that the preset relative price, ¯ p1, declines. From equation (30) it then
follows that today’s marginal cost declines, which in turn shifts down today’s marginal proﬁt
curve in Figure 1. Thus the policy-induced feedback eﬀect reduces the individual ﬁrm’s need
to increase its own relative price in response to the general price increase; that is, it weakens
the strategic complementarities.
It is easily shown that the impact of ¯ p0 on ¯ p1 declines with ¯ p0. Thus, strategic com-
plementarities are weakened the most when the relative price of price-adjusting ﬁrms is the
lowest. The resulting shape of a ﬁrm’s optimal response function is depicted in Figure 3 for
the parameter values used in section 3.3, and assuming that next period’s policy generates
as t e a d y - s t a t ei n ﬂation rate π =1 .05. We can see that for low values of other ﬁrms’ relative
price choice, there are no strategic complementarities, and the reaction function is quite
ﬂat. If other ﬁrms start setting higher relative prices, then an individual ﬁrm’s own optimal
relative price starts to increase and the rate at which it responds also increases. Thus the
reaction function becomes steeper than the 45 degree line and multiple equilibria due to
self-fulﬁlling expectations are possible. In the Appendix we prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose the current and future policymakers use the same money stock rule
˜ m.I f˜ m ∈ (˜ m1, ˜ m2), then, in general, at least two point-in-time equilibria exist. If ˜ m =˜ m1
then the point-in-time equilibrium is unique.
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Figure 3. Optimal Response Function for Money Rule
4.2 An interest rate policy
In this section we evaluate the beneﬁts of using an interest rate instrument to implement
Markov-perfect policies. We ﬁnd that steady-states and point-in-time equilibria are unique,
despite the fact that the reaction function remains characterized by strategic complementar-
ities. In what follows, we solve for the current equilibrium, y, conditional on current policy
z = R and future equilibrium outcomes y0.W i t haﬁxed nominal interest rate, policy aﬀects







which combines (24) and (26). We ﬁrst show existence and uniqueness of the steady-state
and the point-in-time equilibrium. We then show that uniqueness occurs despite the con-
tinued presence of strategic complementarities. Indeed, the interest rate rule strengthens
existing strategic complementarities. Finally, we discuss the existence of a unique rational
18expectations equilibrium for the policy rule.





Proof. Equation (31) and (24) determine the unique steady-state inﬂation rate
π
∗ = βR. (32)























Uniqueness of the point-in-time equilibrium with an inﬂationary interest rate rule is not
due to the elimination of strategic complementarities but to a strengthening of the strategic
complementarities. Consider again the response of an individual ﬁrm to an increase in the
relative price set by all other ﬁrms, but now allow for the feedback coming through the inter-
est rate policy. From equation (31) it now follows that today’s marginal cost increases, which
in turn shifts up today’s marginal proﬁt curve in Figure 1. Thus the policy-induced feedback
eﬀect increases the individual ﬁrm’s need to increase its own relative price in response to the
general price increase; that is, it strengthens the strategic complementarities.







Reaction Function, conditional on interest rate rule

































Figure 4. Optimal Response Function for Nominal Interest Rate Rule
Figure 4 displays the reaction function for the interest rate policy conditional on the
parameterization used in Section 3.3 and assuming that next period’s policy generates a
steady-state inﬂation rate π =1 .05. In the following proposition we state that as long as
tomorrow’s policy does not try to implement price stability, there will always exist a unique
point-in-time equilibrium for the current period.
Proposition 5 (A) If next period’s policy choice attains an inﬂationary or deﬂationary
steady-state outcome, then (1) for any nominal interest rate for which a current period
equilibrium exists it is unique, and (2) there always exists a nominal interest rate for which
an equilibrium exists. (B) If next period’s policy choice attains a steady-state outcome with
stable prices, then (1) the current period equilibrium is indeterminate if current policy also
tries to attain the stable-price steady-state βR =1 ; (2) no current period equilibrium exists
if βR 6=1 .
204.3 Dynamic (in)determinacy
The dynamics of the rational expectations equilibrium conditional on the interest rate policy
are characterized by the ﬁrst order vector diﬀerence equation in (p0t,ψ t) determined by the





























Recall that the preset relative price p1 is determined by p0 through the price index equation
(23). For a locally unique rational expectations equilibrium to exist, both eigenvalues of
the linearized diﬀerence equation system (35) and (36) have to be greater than one. For
the parameterization that we have used in section 3.3, only one of the eigenvalues is greater
than one, independent of the steady-state inﬂation rate around which we approximate the
equation system. In the Appendix we also show that for inﬂation rates close to one and
for very large inﬂation rates, only one of the eigenvalues is greater than one, independent
of the parameter values. Thus the solution to the linearized diﬀerence equation system
tends to be indeterminate, and the rational expectations equilibrium is not locally unique.6
Furthermore, since the dynamics of the economy are characterized in terms of real variables,
the real allocation is indeterminate. This contrasts with Sargent and Wallace’s (1975) study
in which nominal interest rate policies imply an indeterminate price level but a determinate
real allocation. In our environment, the price level is determinate conditional on a given real
allocation,
Pt = P0,t−1/p1,t, P0,t = p0tPt,a n dP1t = p1,tPt. (37)
However, if we restrict the solution of the local dynamics to be in accord with McCallum’s
6In the Appendix we also show that the money supply rule supports a locally unique rational expectations
equilibrum.
21(1983) minimum state variable solution, there is only one such solution, namely p0,t = p∗
0
and ψt = ψ
∗, and the nominal prices are determined conditional on the law of motion, (37),
and the initial price, P0,−1. This is easy to see, since there are no state variables and the
minimum state variable solution must be the steady-state, which is unique. We also note that
in an economy like ours with ﬂexible prices, it is well known that the minimum state variable
solution still displays nominal indeterminacy. This diﬀerence indicates another important
distinction between ﬂexible and sticky price environments.
The policymaker can uniquely implement the Markov-perfect equilibrium through a pol-
icy that jointly determines the nominal interest rate and the money stock. The choice of a
nomial interest rate eliminates the potential for multiple point-in-time equilibria, whereas
the money rule picks the Markov-perfect equilibrium allocation among the possible solutions
to the system of dynamic equations.7
The usual procedure to eliminate dynamic indeterminacies arising from a ﬁxed nominal
interest rate policy — making the interest rate decision contingent on other endogenous vari-
ables; see, e.g., McCallum (1986), Boyd and Dotsey (1994), or Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998)
— cannot be used to implement Markov-perfect equilibria. This approach is not applicable,
since, by deﬁnition, decisions in Markov-perfect equilibria can depend only on payoﬀ-relevant
state variables and not other endogenous variables, be they lagged or contemporaneous.8
Reputation-based time-consistent policies can eliminate dynamic indeterminacies in a way
similar to our approach. For example, Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (2007) implement unique
equilibria based on nominal interest rate rules through the speciﬁcation of the oﬀ-equilibrium
behavior of the policymaker’s history-contingent decision rules.
7We note, however, that implementing this combination policy requires the monetary instrument to
be state contingent. In order to replicate the optimal allocations, the policy-maker would need complete
information. In an environment with incomplete information, it would be interesting to explore the properties
of this type of combination policy.
8This argument does not apply to the implementation of optimal policies with full-commitment; see, e.g.,
by Giannoni and Woodford (2002).
225C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has analyzed the importance of the monetary policy instrument in decentralizing
a time-consistent planner’s optimal policy. In that regard, it is part of a growing literature
investigating the implementation of optimal plans. We have shown that whether a plan-
ner uses a money instrument or an interest rate instrument is crucial for determining if
optimal Markov-perfect allocations can be attained via the appropriate setting of the instru-
ment. King and Wolman (2004) were the ﬁrst to alert us to the non-trivial ramiﬁcations
of decentralization. They produced a surprising result of signiﬁcant impact, namely, that
decentralization is a non-trivial problem. With regard to using a money instrument, im-
plementation of the optimal allocation is unattainable. A time-consistent planner using a
money instrument could not achieve the allocations chosen by a planner who was able to
directly pick allocations. In fact, they showed that steady-states and equilibria were not
unique at the optimal inﬂation rate. Since, in reality, no central bank picks allocations, this
result presents a challenge for understanding just how a time-consistent central bank might
operate.
Intuition gained from the early rational expectations literature on monetary policy as de-
picted in Sargent and Wallace (1975) would suggest that an interest rate instrument would
have similar problems. Here we have shown that it does not. A planner using an interest rate
instrument can achieve the Markov-perfect allocations of the standard time-consistent plan-
ning problem. The result occurs for two key reasons. The interest rate instrument pins down
future inﬂation in ways unobtainable using a money instrument and, in so doing, increases
the degree of strategic complementarity that arises from the monopolistically competitive
price-setting problem itself.
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25Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1. Strategic Complementari-
ties
The optimal relative price of a price-setting ﬁrm satisﬁes the FOC for proﬁt maximization
(22). With constant marginal cost, ψ = ψ
0,a n dp o s i t i v ei n ﬂation this implies
p0 ≥ μψ ≥ 1 ≥ p0/π
0 (A.1)
since the marginal proﬁt function is decreasing in p0. The derivative of the ﬁrm’s marginal
proﬁtt o m o r r o ww i t hr e s p e c tt oi n ﬂation is
∂MP (p0/π0,ψ)/π0















Note that with zero inﬂation the optimal relative price satisﬁes p0 = μψ.S i n c ew e h a v e a
positive markup, μ>1,w eg e t
μ
2ψ>μ ψ= p0. (A.4)
By continuity condition (A.3) is satisﬁed for a neighborhood around zero inﬂation.¥
B Proof of Proposition 3. Nonuniqueness of PITE
with Money Rule
Suppose that today’s and tomorrow’s policymakers choose the same policy rule, ˜ m =˜ m0 ∈
(˜ m1, ˜ m2). From Proposition 2 this policy is consistent with the existence of two steady-state
equilibria. We now show that even conditional on choosing future behavior to be in accord




∗, there exist two point-in-time
equilibria in the current period. An individual ﬁrm’s optimal relative price is determined by





conditional on today’s marginal cost and tomorrow’s marginal cost and inﬂation rate. To-













26In equation (B.2) the left-hand-side price p0 is interpreted as an individual ﬁrm’s optimal
relative price in response to the expected aggregate relative prices, p0 and p∗
1,o nt h er i g h t -
hand-side. Note that the price index equation (23) implies that p1 is a decreasing function
of p0. For parameter values and policy choice such that μχ˜ m =1 , we can interpret g as the
reaction function and Figure 3 can be used to visualize the argument below.
One can show that the ‘reaction’ function g in terms of the relative price p0 intersects

























As p0 becomes large, g(p0,p ∗

















We can now show that for ˜ m ∈ (˜ m1, ˜ m2) the LHS and the RHS of expression (B.2)
will in general intersect twice. On the one hand, from Proposition 2 it follows that since
˜ m>˜ m1,t h a ti s ,μχ˜ m>1,t h es l o p ec o e ﬃcient of the LHS linear expression in p0 is less
than one. Thus the LHS deﬁnes a line through the origin below the 45-degree line. On the
other hand, the RHS of (B.2) intersects the 45-degree line at p0 =1 , and stays above (below)
the 45-degree line whenever p0 is less than (greater than) one. Furthermore, as p0 becomes
a r b i t r a r i l yl a r g et h eR H So f( B . 2 )c o n v e r g e st ot h e4 5 - d e g r e el i n ef r o mb e l o w .
Since the LHS is strictly below the RHS for p0 ≤ 1, the two curves do not intersect in
this range. We know that at least one intersection point exists, since we consider policy
rules that are consistent with the existence of a steady-state, and the steady-state price is a
solution to the reaction function (B.2). Thus there must be an intersection point for p0 > 1.
If ˜ m =˜ m1, then we know that a unique non-inﬂationary steady-state with p0 =1exists,
and this steady-state also satisﬁes (B.2). For this case, the LHS is the 45-degree line and the
RHS has a unique intersection with the 45-degree line at p0 =1 . Furthermore, from (B.5)
it follows that the slope of the RHS at p0 =1is negative. With a marginally larger value of
˜ m, the slope of the LHS becomes less than one, and there will be at least two intersections
with the RHS to the right of p0 =1 .¥
27C Proof of Proposition 4. (Non)uniqueness of PITE
with Interest Rate Rule
The current equilibrium is deﬁned by the two equations (31) and (22), which map the current
period relative price p0 to current period marginal cost ψ. Rewriting (22), we have


























, and next period’s variables are evaluated at their steady-
state values, p∗
1 and ψ
∗ as determined by (32), (33) and (34). An intersection of the two
functions represents a potential equilibrium.
The two functions always intersect at p0 =0 ,b u tp0 =0is not a feasible outcome, since
the price index equation (23) together with p1 being positive implies a lower bound, p0, for

































The sign of the term A0 depends on the inﬂationary stance of next period’s steady-state
policy. From (22) we get
βA









































The ﬁrst equality uses the steady-state expression for next period’s marginal cost (34), and
the second equality uses the steady-state expression for next period’s inﬂation rate (33).
Thus A0 is negative (positive) if next period’s policy is inﬂationary, π∗ > 1 (deﬂationary,
π∗ < 1), and A0 =0if next period’s policy implements price stability, π∗ =1 .
If next period’s policy is inﬂationary and an intersection between f1 and f2 exists for
28positive values of p0,t h ei n t e r s e c t i o np o i n ti su n i q u es i n c et h ef u n c t i o nf1 is linear and the
function f2 is strictly concave. The two functions intersect for positive p0 if at p0 =0the
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p0=0
(C.7)
This condition can always be satisﬁed for a suﬃciently large nominal interest rate R ≥ 1.I n
other words the policymaker can always ﬁnd an interest rate for which the functions intersect.
Recall that there is a lower bound for feasible relative prices p
¯
0, so the policymaker has to
choose an interest rate that implies a suﬃciently large value for the relative price p0.A
policymaker can always ﬁnd such an interest rate, since he can always replicate the steady-
state by choosing R = R∗. Thus there exists a choice for R such that an equilibrium exists
and it is unique. An analogous argument applies if next period’s policy is deﬂationary.
If next period’s policy implements price stability, that is, ψ
∗ =1 /μ and p∗
1 =1 ,t h e n
the only policy for today that is consistent with the existence of an equilibrium is a nominal
interest rate such that βR =1 . But then equations (C.1) and (C.2) are satisﬁed for any
feasible combination of (p0,ψ) such that
p0 > p
¯
0 and ψ = p0/μ.
If current policy is inﬂationary or deﬂationary, βR 6=1 , then the only solution to equations
(C.1) and (C.2) is p0 =0 .B u tp0 =0is not a feasible outcome, so no equilibrium exists. ¥
D Local (in)determinacy of the rational expectations
equilibrium
D.1 The money stock rule
If the policymaker follows a money-supply rule, we can substitute for marginal cost from












1−ε (1 − μχ˜ m).
The use of the price index equation (23) for the preset relative price is implicit. Log-linearzing
this equation at a steady-state yields
ˆ p0 = β
1 − μχ˜ m




and the equilibrium is locally unique if the absolute value of the scale coeﬃcient on the right-
hand-side is less than one. We now use the expression for the steady-state with a money
rule and get











29For positive inﬂation rates the function h(π) > 1 and the expression in parentheses in the
denominator is greater than one. Therefore the numerator is smaller than the denominator,
and the scale coeﬃcient is less than one. Thus the equilibrium is locally stable for any
positive steady-state inﬂation rate.
D.2 The nominal interest rate rule





1−ε(1 − μz)=−β (p
0
1)
1−ε (1 − μz
0q
0)
where q ≡ p0/p1. Log-linearizing the two equations around the steady-state yields













1 − μq0z0ˆ z
0 + aˆ p
0
0 (D.9)





















with C = ∆
∙












Let tr denote the trace of C and det denote the determinant of C,
det = −π
ε−1 (D.11)
















From the Schur-Cohn Criterion and some algebra we get that the roots of the characteristic
polynomial of C satisfy the following conditions:
• both roots are inside the unit circle if
|det| < 1 and |tr| < 1+d e t ; (D.13)
30• both roots are outside the unit circle if
either det > 1 and |tr| < 1+d e t (D.14)
or det < −1 and |tr| < −(1 + det);
• o n er o o ti si n s i d ea n do n er o o ti so u t s i d et h eu n i tc i r c l ei f
|tr| > |1+d e t |; (D.15)
For price stability, π =1 , the rational expectations equilibrium is locally indeterminate
since 1+d e t=0and tr = ∞ and condition (D.15) is satisﬁed. Therefore the rational
expectations equilibrium is locally indeterminate for a neighborhood of price stability. For
l a r g ev a l u e so ft h ei n ﬂation rate, condition (D.15) is also satisﬁed, since the polynominal in
the inﬂation rate deﬁned by the function f is of higher order than ε − 1.W ea r eu n a b l et o
prove that condition (D.15) is satisﬁed for all intermediate values of the inﬂation rate but,
given our baseline calibration in section 3.3 condition, (D.15) is satisﬁed for all values of the
inﬂation rate.
31